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WRITERS ON INVESTMENT theory and practice seem to be almost uni-
versally agreed on the fact that one of the crucial general tests of invest-
ment quality is "safety of principal." For instance, in their outstanding
work on investment analysis, Graham and Dodd make "safety of prin-
cipal" an essential element in their definition of an investment commit-
ment; the proposition is advanced that unless a commitment to securi-
ties promises such safety it is not an investment but must be relegated
to the rather dubious category of a "speculation.?'
In view of the importance thus attached to "safety of principal," it
might be expected that something very precise and distinct would be
implied by this incontestably desirable attribute. However, one finds
that the usual discussion of the safety concept does not lead to sharply
defined conclusions that may be applied to specific investment deci-
sions. This is true to some extent in the treatment of fixed income se-
curities, but there is an especial lack of distinct implications in the field
of common stocks.
In this article it is intended that attention will be concentrated on
three major questions involved in the appraisal of common stocks rela-
tive to their safety elements. First, should a distinction be drawn be-
tween "safety of principal" and "recoverability of principal"? If there
is such a distinction, what is the relationship between volatility of mar-
ket price and safety? Second, is it always necessary to diversify com-
mitments to common stocks in order to obtain even a modicum of safe-
ty? If so, why is it that a commitment to a single common stock does
not have the "safety" essential to classify it as an investment? Third,
should "safety of principal" be interpreted mainly in the light of dollar
values or should greater specific emphasis be placed on so-called ureal"
values when this concept is discussed as a measure of investment qual-
ity? Some of these questions have been discussed by investment au-
thorities under various topical headings, but to my knowledge they
have never been specifically considered as a whole when the focus of
attenton was on "safety of principal" as a general test of investment
quality.
I. B. Grahamand D. L. Dodd,SecuNl, Arwl,sis (Second Edition,NewYork: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1940), pp, 63-6+
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On the whole it does not appear very enlightening to define a safe
stock as one which in all probability will be "worth" the price paid for
it.2 To be very useful as either a theoretical or practical definition it
would seem obvious that it is necessary to remove the ambiguities per-
taining to the critical word in this definition: "worth." Without at-
tempting to appear dogmatic on the subject it may be conjectured that
the ordinary purchaser of securities would be inclined to identify
"worth" and market price. This is not to say that minor variations in
market price would have disturbing implications as to "worth" and re-
sultant safety, but if any material depreciation ensued in the market
price after purchase (say 30 per cent), then the average investor might
be hard pressed to imagine that the stock was "worth" the price paid.
The natural conclusion from this general identity: any stock having a
volatile price history and therefore vulnerable marketwise could not
properly be classified as an investment promising safety of principal.
And as a large number of common stocks have been unstable pricewise,
the fieldof investment in common stocks (requiring by definition "safe-
ty of principal") would thereby be drastically limited unless some
method could be suggested to offset the possibility of unsatisfactory
price experience.
It is probably fair to state that the most common technique intro-
duced by investment practitioners to minimize variations in the market
value of a portfolio is diversification. Orthodox practice involves invest-
ment operations in common stocks (as presumably contrasted to specu-
lation) being limited to group operations involving industry and com-
pany diversification before even the semblance of safety is achieved.
Along this line Graham and Dodd state that "instability" of common
stocks requires the "investor" to commit funds to common stocks only
if a diversified group can be obtained.! However, in fairness to the au-
thors it must be pointed out that it is not entirely clear if cyclical "in-
stability" is the crucial factor or if "instability" in "value" due to un-
predictable secular developments is of prime importance.s The latter
factor relates mainly to shortcomings in the valuation process which
are discussed below rather than to variable cyclical prices with long-
term "values" presumably remaining constant.
It is certainly not my purpose to deplore diversification, which is ob-
viously a desirable attribute of any security portfolio, but strictly in-
terpreted it means that no individual can embark on an "investment"
2. Ibid., pp. 63""64.
3. Ibid., p. 362.
4. Ibid., pp. 345-48. However, it might be noted that in this discussion the tendency for
common stock prices to fluctuate more widely in recent years isused to indicate the increas-
JIg "instability" of common stocks.
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in common stocks until sufficient funds are available to make possible
the acquisition of a considerable number of issues.! It is thus implied
that the investor will avoid common stocks until the funds at his dis-
posal are relatively large, or possibly he may turn to the investment
funds or perhaps to insurance companies which by themselves have di-
versified portfolios. But even a cursory review of the price histories of
the shares of investment funds or insurance companies will reveal that
price volatility is not avoided by purchasing a share in one diversified
portfolio of such a company. In my opinion the divergent records of
these companies make the case for diversification almost, if not equally,
as strong when the shares of these companies are acquired.
Recently, however, Mr. Graham has convincingly argued that the
"safety of principal" of funds intrusted to common stocks is not im-
paired by market fluctuations," If we accept his argument, then "safe-
ty" should be carefully and completely divorced from "recoverability"
or liquidity. In view of its importance brief attention might be devoted
to the hypotheses underlying the logical separation of "safety" and
market price. His conclusion seems to be based on two fundamental as-
sumptions with respect to the nature of an investment operation.
First, it is assumed that liquidity is not an integral feature of an invest-
ment in common stocks. It should be specifically recognized. by the in-
vestor that if there is a reasonable possibility that he may have to re-
cover a significant segment of his principal for use elsewhere at unpre-
dictable times in the future, then an investment operation in common
stocks is not advisable. But in lesser degree the same recommendation
holds true for any commitment to securities outside of high-grade short-
term bonds or government savings bonds.
Second, it is assumed that an investment in common stocks is made
only after an intelligent and objective valuation has been formulated
and that the price paid for a stock does not exceed the valuation so de-
termined. Then so long as the investor'sjudgment regarding the valua-
tion remains valid, the principal committed to the stock is "safe" ir-
respective of market aberrations. From this argument it follows that if
stocks are bought without reference to a systematic valuation process
or if the prices paid exceed the valuation estimates, then the principal
committed to such stocks is "unsafe" by the difference between the
valuation price and the purchase price.
5. See R. E. Badger and H. G. Guthmann, Inwslnunl Pri"dples IJIId p,.aaku (New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1941). Common stocks are held less suitable to the small investor
because of the absolute need for diversification. It is also held that the "largest possibili-
ties" of principal losses arise out of the cyclical price movements of common stocks (pp.
265-69)·
6. B. Graham, T1r4 I#lkUlgmlI"vesItw (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), pp. 41-46.
78-80.
The Journal of Finance
As a theoretical approach to "safety of principal" of common stocks,
this argument seems to have considerable merit. It warns the investor
that he may expect the market value of his portfolio to deteriorate
below cost at any time. But it further makes clear that so long as no
untoward event intervenes to vitiate his appraisal of the long-term
prospects he has all the essential elements of "safety." The main dif-
ficulty which seems inherent in this approach is the assumption that
objective and intelligent valuations of common stocks can actually be
made in practice.
What are the obstacles to the valuation of common stocks? In the
first place our economy is dynamic in character. This means that there
are constant secular changes affecting industries and companies. New
products and services are developed which render obsolete the demand
for established products and services. There may be no public knowl-
edge of these new products and services until they appear on the scene
and modify or destroy the value of companies engaged in the produc-
tion of competing goods. Obviously the valuation process cannot be ex-
pected to foreseeall possibilitiesof secular decline in the positions of the
companies analyzed. No matter how refined investment techniques be-
come the valuation process may be vitiated by such developments.
But this source of "risk" leading to lack of safety should be appraised
in its proper perspective and scope.As to perspective, it might be noted
that other long-term "risks" might be equally significant relative to the
real value of the principal and they cannot be ignored in any well-con-
ceived investment operation. The risk involved in the long-term value
of the unit of account has perhaps received the most attention in recent
years. As to scope, it might be pointed out that many years ago Edgar
L. Smith showed that such risks cannot be avoided by concentrating in
high-grade corporate bonds." If an industry encounters drastic secular
adversity, bondholders of companies within that industry can expect
losses almost commensurate with the stockholders of the same com-
panies. Bankruptcies brought about by the obsolescence of products
are hardly ever happy to the investors concerned regardless of the type
of security held. In other words, no corporate security is immune to the
secular risk as bondholders of the transit companies might testify.
The second main difficulty encountered in the valuation of common
stocks lies in the fact that the value of a common stock is dependent
largely upon an estimate of "earning power." It is at this point that
there is a fundamental difference between the approach to fixed income
securities and common stocks which makes the analysis of common
7. E. L. Smith, Common Siods as Long-Term Investmmts (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1924), pp. 94'"98·
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stocks immeasurably more difficult than bonds or preferred stocks.
With the latter it is only necessary to be reasonably convinced that the
earnings protection afforded the interest or dividend coupon is going to
be adequate in the future. In a great many cases the analyst can be
reasonably convinced of this adequacy from an inspection of the past
record. But in the case of common stock it is not sufficient to conclude
that future earnings are reasonably certain to be adequate. It is neces-
sary in addition to attempt the derivation of some estimate of the
actual future level of earnings. 8
For example, if a company has $2 million of interest charges and if
"earnings available for fixed charges" has varied over the past decade
or so between $10 minion and $20 million, a conclusion might well be
reached that the bonds of this company deserve a high-grade rating and
a resultant value as a "money" bond. It makes little difference whether
future earnings average $10 million or $20 million so far as the status
of these bonds is concerned; in either case they would merit their high-
grade rating. However, it makes a great deal of difference to the value
of the common stock. If earnings are expected to average $10 million
then a much lower value would be placed on the common equity than if
the estimate was set at $20 million.
Various analytical techniques have been suggested to estimate "earn-
ing power." Perhaps the most widely used is that of the arithmetic
average of past earnings over at least one complete business cycle. Such
a solution might be the best available expedient, but implicit in this
technique is the assumption that the pattern of cyclical fluctuations in
business in the future is going to resemble the pattern of the decade or
so covered by these average figures.This crucial assumption is of course
one which is very tenuous and can be supported only by references to
historical precedents. The use of the simple arithmetic average of past
earnings as the quantitative indication of earning power also ignores the
factors of trend and possible structural changes in the company and in
the economy as a whole.To give effect to those matters more emphasis
may be placed on more recent earnings or additional refinements of
technique may be adopted. But no matter how elaborate the statistical
technique, the "earning power" estimate in many cases cannot be re-
solved with any degree of confidence.
Thus while in theory common stock investors can obtain safety of
principal by purchasing stocks at prices at or below their reasonable
values, in practice such safety is difficult to obtain because of the uncer-
tainties involved in many cases in the valuation process. But at this
8. See G. W. Dowrie and D. R. Fuller, InfJUtme1lls (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1950), p, 270.
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point the principles of diversification are again introduced. Here we are
not attempting to protect the investor against cyclical movements in
stock. prices resulting from variations in the business outlook or from
short-term changes in the relative positions of various industries. In-
stead, the main objective of diversification is to protect the investor
against the possible errors inherent in the valuation process. A rather
crude "law of averages" is applied. Presumably the possibility of over-
estimating a single company's future earning potential will not be dis-
astrous to the over-all principal value, and besides, favorable results
may accrue from underestimating the potential of other companies. In
this way the over-all principal value of the portfolio may be regarded as
reasonably safe.
But it would also seem to followthat if the investor can be unusually
confident of his earning-power estimate and resultant value, there is a
lessened need for diversification to obtain safety of principal. Also the
suggestion might be offered that if the price of a stock is materially
below any conservatively estimated value, there is less need for diversi-
fication because the estimate of earning power has a very large "margin
of safety." Let us examine each of these possibilities in tum.
While admittedly not typical, it is possible that the analyst may
have a very high degree of confidence in the earning-power estimates of
certain companies. The required characteristic of such companies
would be the indication of exceptional prospects of stability both in a
cyclical and secuiar sense. From a quantitative standpoint earnings
should vary in a relatively narrow range about the average, and the
secular trend (if any) should not be unfavorable. From a qualitative
standpoint the company's products should appear to have an inelastic
demand in both a price and income sense, and competitive conditions
should be orderly. Conservative financing and reasonable control of
costs should be indicated. Specifically certain enterprises engaged in
industries such as banking, food production and distribution, tobacco,
and electric power might well meet these requirements among others.
But even under conditions where substantial confidence can be
placed in the estimates of earning power, there is a further requisite
before safety of principal is obtained. The price of the stock must be in
reasonable relationship to the estimated earnings. However, the ques-
tion immediately arises as to what benchmark may be applied to deter-
mine whether the price is reasonable relative to earnings. In brief, the
problem can be stated in terms of the orthodox and familiar "capitaliza-
tion rate." Unless some guidepost exists to limit the "capitalization
rate" to reasonable proportions, safety of principal cannot be obtained.
It is at this point that the "margin of safety" concept, developed by
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Benjamin Graham in his most recent book, provides the basis for a
solution. In brief, "margin of safety" relates the earnings yield (based
on estimated earning power) of a common stock to the yield obtainable
on high-grade bonds. Graham suggests that the earnings yield on a
stock should be at least twice bond yields before the "margin of safety"
is adequate." In other words, if the bond yields are roughly 3 per cent,
then safety of principal is obtainable only if the capitalization rate is 6
per cent or higher. Put in terms of the more familiar Price-Earnings
ratio, the maximum PIE ratio which can prevail and still obtain safety
of principal, when bonds are yielding 3 per cent, would be 16.6"· A
theoretical definition of a "safe" stock is thus suggested: safety of prin-
cipal is achieved when the earnings yield based on a conservative ap-
praisal of earning power is at least two times high-grade bond yields.
Now, like any other investment standards or techniques, intermi-
nable debate could be devoted to the question as to whether or not a
"margin of safety" of two is adequate or whether it should be less or
more. But the same sort of debate is possible with respect to standards
of bond selection, such as whether the "times charges earned" ratio
should be two, three, or something- else before reasonable safety is
achieved. While the matter cannot be termed unimportant, it is ob-
viously a moot question not subject to mathematical solution but de-
pendent upon empirical judgments. Merely as a matter of judgment, it
would seem that Graham's suggested "margin of safety" of two is rea-
sonably conservative.
Actually the "margin of safety" approach seems to be an extension
to common stock valuation of the "times fixed charges earned" tech-
nique used to appraise fixed-income securities. And because it applies
quantitative limitations to the investment values of common stocks,
this concept or something reasonably related thereto must necessarily
be used in common stock valuations. But because of this apparent close
relationship with an important technique of bond analysis, at least one
important problem is raised which is pertinent to the question of safety
of principal. In the case of bonds it seems eminently reasonable to hold
that the safety of a bond is jeopardized when and if the average earn-
ings coverage of fixed charges falls below say three times in the case of
an industrial company. In this way a "safe" commitment may become
"unsafe" before earnings have declined to a point where they are just
equal to bond interest requirements.
Thus, only if the analyst felt that a very high degree of confidence
could be placed in the estimate of earning power would a capitalization
9. Graham, Ope ciI., p. 255.
10. Dowrie and Fuller, Ope cil., suggest a PIE ratio of IS or an earnings yield of 6.6 per
cent, but this figure is rather arbitrarily selected (P.5I5).
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rate of only two times the bond yield rate be justified. Presumably such
a company should indicate on all counts either considerable stability
(both from a cyclical and secular point of view) or a definite upward
secular trend before the minimum "margin of safety" (two) could be
held to promise safety of principal. But if the common stock of such a
company could be bought at say twelve times the estimated earning
potential or on an earnings yield basis of 8.3 per cent, which would give
a "margin of safety" of almost three at the present time, it is my feeling
that such a commitment alone would promise safety of principal suf-
ficient to classify it as a true investment.
To make this discussion more concrete two examples might be cited
of such stocks: Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company and Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Company. The table below shows the earn-
ings and dividends per share of these two companies for the years
1936-41 inclusive and 1946-49 inclusive, and the price range of the
stocks over the years 1948-49. The range of earnings of the obviously
less indicative war years is also shown.
CEHTIlAL HANoyn BANK LIGGETT AND MYEas
AND 1'ltl1ST COMPANY
Earn- DiYi- Earn- Diyi-
Yu. iog.· dend. Price ings dead. Price
1936 ....... 6.50 4. 00 7. 25 7. 00
1937······ . 7.50 4. 00 6·35 6.00
1938 ....... 5. 01 4·00 6·09 5. 00
1939······ . 5. 15 4. 00 6.13 5·00
1940 ....... 6.24 4·00 6.02 5. 00
1941....... 6.31 4. 00 5. 22 5·00
1942-45 .... 5·76-8·79 4·00 4· 25-4.50 3.50
1946 ....... 8.04 4. 00 5.40 4. 00
1947······ . 6.68 4·00 6.80 4.50
1948....... 6.86 4. 00 8l - 98 8.80 5.00 824)1
1949······ . 6.52 4. 00 82!-102 7·20 5. 00 724)l
• Gains on .ales of securities excluded.
The quantitative stability indicated by the reported earnings can be
supported on qualitative grounds. Central Hanover, a large money
market bank in New York, derives its earnings from government bonds
and a diversified loan portfolio and its earnings are largely functions of
the volume of deposits, money rates, and reserve requirements. How-
ever, as the first two of these factors are not subject to drastic change
and as the reserve requirements in recent years have been relatively
near the peak allowed by existing law, the risks associated with the
earning power seem relatively negligible. It also might be pertinent to
note that the book value of this stock was in excess of $125 per share at
the end of 1948 and is still larger today. If this stock had been pur-
chased about midway in the price ranges of 1948-49 or at about 90, the
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earnings yield based on average earnings of $6.70 a share would have
been 7.33 per cent and the dividend yield 4.4 per cent. The "margin of
safety" thus indicated would have been about 2.5 times conservatively
computed by estimating high grade bond yields as 3 per cent. Only to
the extent that the earning power of Central Hanover might be ma-
terially less than about $5.50 per share in the future would the principal
be unsafe at a price of 90, and the apparent remoteness of this possibil-
ity is a reflection of the safety of an investment in this stock at 90 or
below.
Liggett and Myers occupies a strong position as one of the "Big
Three" in the tobacco industry with its main revenues dependent upon
the sale of a product which can be classified as a low-priced consumer
good having an inelastic demand. Costs are largely a function of the
price of raw tobacco and large inventories are required. Some risks are
associated with the large inventory commitments and the resultant
senior capital used to finance the inventories. However, as the minimum
coverage of fixed charges over the past thirteen years has exceeded
three times and as prices have been adjusted on an orderly industry-
wide basis to rising costs of tobacco, the business and financial risks
seem relatively moderate. At a price of about 80 or eight points above
the 1949 low the stock would indicate an earnings yield of 8.1 per cent
on average earnings over the years 1936-41 and 1946-49 inclusive. The
"margin of safety" thus shown would be 2.7 times, and earning power
would have to decline below $4.80 per share before the safety as defined
above would bequestioned. Outside of the war years earnings in-every
year from 1935 to date have exceeded $4.80 per share which roughly
appraises the possibility of this contingency.
In additionspecial commitments might be made in less stable com-
mon stocks during periods of depressed market prices which can satisfy
the foregoing definition of safety of principal without requiring diversi-
fication. At such times the current outlook for business would undoubt-
edly be dismal and the investor's liquid funds available for investment
might well be limited. To hold that the investor should refrain from ap-
parent bargains in common stocks unless he has sufficient funds to ac-
quire a diversified portfolio would in many cases negate the opportuni-
ties presented by such markets. This observation, of course, rules out
the possibility that a diversified portfolio is already held at the time the
opportunities offered by the depressed market presents itself.
Under the conditions envisaged, the market prices of many stocks
would be strongly influenced by transient emotional factors or by a
large floating supply contributed by owners hard-pressed for liquidity.
The market deterioration following the outbreak of the war with Japan
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and Germany in 1942 might be offered as a specific case in point; the
1932 debacle is perhaps another instance. Under these circumstances
seasoned stocks of large, well-established companies may be available
at prices wherein the "margin of safety" based on an objective long-
run appraisal of earning power is ridiculously large. In these cases it
might even be apparent that the need to estimate the actual level of
future earnings described above as a typical element in common stock
valuation becomes less necessary. Here the investor-analyst might well
reach the conclusion that while the absolute level of future earnings is
most difficult to predict with any degree of confidence, it would be ex-
tremely unlikely for the company's average earnings to be less than
that required to maintain an earnings yield of at least two times bond
yields on the cost of the stock. Let us imagine a wen-established com-
pany, conservatively financed, selling at only four or five times average
earnings over a long-term period. At the time in question the current
earnings of the company might be negligible, but the purchase of this
stock in and of itself might well promise reasonable safety of principal
as defined above and thus meet a basic test of an investment operation.
The approach to situations of this kind might thus be somewhat
negative in character: determine the lowest earning power that would
give a "margin of safety" of two times bond yields and objectively in-
quire as to whether such a low earning power could reasonably be ex-
pected in the future. Let us adopt this approach in the analysis of two
large companies as of 1942. Shown beloware the earnings and dividends
of Sears, Roebuck and Company and Firestone Tire and Rubber Com-
panyover twelve and thirteen years respectively prior to 1942.
Sa.uts. ROElIVa AJlI) CoXPAIfY FmEUOD TJu AJlI) RVBIIU. CoxpAIfY
E&nI- Divl- Earll- Dlvi-
Year illga deods Year Illp deods
1929.......... 6.62 2.50 1929.......... 3. 27 2.00
193°········· . 3. 01 2.50 193°········· . (d) .65 1·45
1931.......... 2·47 2.50 1931.......... 1.26 1.00
1932-33······ . (d) 0.53· 1.25 1932. .. . .. . .. . 1.07 1.00
1934········· . 2·35 1933· .. · .. · .. · (d) .21 ·55
"1935· ......... 3. 13 1934········· . ·71 ·4°
1936 ........ . . 4·45 1.75 1935· .. · .. ··· . 1·53 ·4°
1937· .... ···· . 5. 60 6-.25 1936. .. . .. . . . . 3. 28 1.40
1938....... - .. 5.58 5.50 1937.. · .... ·· . 3·33 2.00
1939········· . 4. 18 3·00 1938.......... 1.27 1.25
194°········· . 6.60 4. 25 1939· .. . .. . .. . 2.03 1.00
1941.......... 6·32 4·25 194°.· ........ 3. 02 1.25
1941.......... 4·37 1.50
·Filcalyearchansed to lanuuy 31.
Both of these companies were well intrenched in their respective in-
dustries and showed no evidence of a secular decline; they both had a
long record of profitable operation and no serious difficulties were en-
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countered during the depression with respect to securities senior to the
common stock. Dividends on Firestone common had been paid in every
rear since 1910 and while Sears had omitted payments in a few years,
the interruptions were not of long duration. However, it is notable that
the earnings of both these companies had varied over a relatively wide
range. But, counting earnings in the years in which small deficits were
incurred as zero, average earnings were about $4.20 per share for Sears
and $1.93 for Firestone. Admittedly average earnings are less signifi-
cant when the variation about the average is relatively great. However,
as the years covered were weighted by the inclusion of the "Great De-
pression," the use of average earnings as a point of departure for the
estimation of earning power may be regarded as eminently conserva-
tive.
In the latter part of 1941 and/or early 1942, Sears was selling at 43
and Firestone at 13. Such prices indicate an earnings yield on average
earnings of almost 10 per cent on Sears and 15 per cent on Firestone.
The "margin of safety" was thus more than three times bond yields on
Sears and about five times on Firestone. Before the "margin of safety"
would be less than two times bond yields on Sears the earning potential
would have to be written down to about $2.50 or about what was earned
in the depression years of 1931 and 1934. Logically it would seem very
doubtful in spite of the war and the unknowns associated therewith if
the future earning power of Sears could have reasonably been placed at
no better than earnings realized during two years of extreme <3epres-
sion. The earning power necessary to produce a "margin of safety" on
Firestone of only two times bond yields at a price of 13 would be about
$0.80 per share. This was less than was actually earned in 1931 and
1932. Again while the actual prediction of the future earning power of
Firestone would have been difficult in 1942, it would also be most dif-
ficult to imagine that it would be less than that required to give a
"margin of safety" of at least two times bond yields. If this is true then
reasonable safety would be achieved by a commitment to either stock
by itself at prices then prevailing.
Market circumstances such as the foregoing are only infrequently en-
countered; and stocks possessing the necessary stability of earnings
along with a price which will obtain the necessary "margin of safety"
are admittedly not typical of the great majority of common stocks. But
at the same time these cases might well be of sufficient importance to
warrant a qualification of the generalization that onlydiversified group
purchases of common stocks can qualify as "investment" commit-
ments.
Finally the question might be raised as to whether the safety of prin-
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cipal test should give greater attention to "real" values as opposed to
"dollar" values. Back in 1924 Smith pointed out that the safety of bond
investments was largely illusory when allowance is made for possible
erosion in the purchasing power of the dollar.II This is an incontestable
theoretical concept. But possibly in order to avoid undue complications
at the time when fundamental investment tests or policies are consid-
ered, many texts on investments seem to imply that dollar safety is the
primary objective." In later sections of some of these books the ques-
tion of the "purchasing power risk" is introduced, sometimes rather
reluctantly, as a matter of concern in the establishment of an invest-
ment policy. This treatment seems rather inconsistent. If an investor is
conditioned to seek safety of principal in dollar terms as a basic objec-
tive of an investment operation, how logically can he be informed at a
later point that this objective must be abandoned in part in formulating
an intelligent investment program?
Unfortunately experience suggests that there is no known way where-
by the investor can achieve assurance of safety of principal in real terms
out of income-producing investments. But this fact does not reduce the
importance of the problem. Furthermore, the principal of a bond port-
folio is obviously not safe in real terms if there is any reasonable pros-
pect that the value of the unit of account will be subject to future
depreciation. In the case of common stocks this easy generality cannot
be made, but it is also impossible to predict with any degree of assur-
ance that the earning power of common stocks will have a direct cor-
relation with price levels and thus that their dollar value (not neces-
sarily price) will also be a partial function of the price level prevailing
through time. Nevertheless without going into the matter in detail it
has been alleged that the earning power of certain types of companies is
likely to vary directly, although not necessarily proportionately, with
variations in the price level. Thus if a significant and permanent depre-
ciation was apparent in the value of the unit of account, there would be
reason to establish a somewhat higher valuation on such stocks thereby
increasing the dollar valuation of principal. Unfortunately the type of
stocks which are usually thought of as having their earning power de-
pendent upon price levels in part, i.e., "commodity" stocks such as oils
and coppers, are also subject to wide cyclical variations in earnings and
thus at the outset their valuations are more difficult to appraise. As a
result, while safety of principal might be protected in real terms by such
commitments, a larger "margin of safety" would be required because of
II. Smith, op.cu., pp. 92-100.
12. See for example D. F. Jordan, On Inwslnunts (Fourth Edition, New York: Prentice-
Hall, 1941), p. 251. Also Graham and Dodd, op.cil., pp. 63-64;. Badger and Guthmann,
op.ell.,pp. 87-88.
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the inability of the analyst to predict any level of earning power with
confidence.
The assumption that there are companies whose earning power is a
function of price levels has not been definitely proved; additional em-
pirical research in this area undoubtedly is desirable. However, even if
convincing proof is lacking on the subject, it might be suggested that a
more consistent application of the purchasing-power theory to the safe-
ty concept would in general tend to reduce the difference ordinarily
alleged to exist between bonds and stocks at this point.
In brief it is held that investment texts ought to give more emphatic
recognition to the fact that principal lossesin real values are suffered in
bond investments when a structural change depreciates the value of the
unit of account. It is further held that only if this qualification is spe-
cifically made does the safety of principal objective have any meaning-
ful implications to the individual investor under conditions of recent
years wherein the value of the dollar seems to be willingly sacrificed to
various political and social objectives of the government.
To some extent it is unfortunate that "safety of principal" has be-
come such a universally accepted cliche in discussions of investment
principles and practices because it is quite likely that casual use of the
phrase will have widely different meanings to various investors. Some
might well regard "safety" as being synonomous with "recoverability,"
and thus limit their conception of "safe" investments to those promis-
ing dollar stability of market price. Others might think of "safety"
strictly in dollar terms wherein it becomesmore or less identifiable with
assurance of continuity of income. Still others, taking a broader view,
might well take the attitude that "safety" cannot possibly be achieved
in any absolute sense in view of the wide range of risks that confront the
investor in the real world. From this viewpoint "safety" becomes an
illusion, and the investor is well advised to forget the phrase and spell
out his objectives with a greater degree of precision. But inasmuch as
"safety of principal" has become an integral part of the jargon of in-
vestment theory and practice, it is felt that various aspects of its mean-
ing and implications deserve greater attention by writers on the subject
of investments.
